Variations on the Knapsack Generator

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KNAPSACK GENERATOR





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1 Definitions:

2 First attack against the Knapsack Generator

3 New attack against the Knapsack Generator

PRNG

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(almost) Knapsack Problem



What is in the knapsack ?

Subset Sum Problem

Mathematic version

The weight list: The secret composition: The target weight:

$$\boldsymbol{\omega} = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n) \in \{0, N\}^n$$
$$\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n$$
$$v = \sum \omega_i u_i = \langle \boldsymbol{\omega}, \mathbf{u} \rangle$$

Subset Sum Problem

Mathematic version

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{The weight list:} & \boldsymbol{\omega} = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n) \in \{0, N\}^n \\ \text{The secret composition:} & \mathbf{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n \\ \text{The target weight:} & v = \sum \omega_i u_i = \langle \boldsymbol{\omega}, \mathbf{u} \rangle \\ \end{array}$

The Subset Sum Problem is NP-hard and remain hard if we replace v by $v \mod N$ as long as $N \simeq 2^n$.

$$\mathbf{u} \longrightarrow \langle \boldsymbol{\omega}, . \rangle \bmod 2^n \longrightarrow v$$









¹Rueppel, R.A., Massey, J.L.: Knapsack as a nonlinear function. In: IEEE Intern. Symp. of Inform. Theory, vol. 46 (1985)



We call δ_i the truncated bits : $v_i = 2^{\ell} s_i + \delta_i$.

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secret : u + ω

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32 bits 1024 bits



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Can we distinguish between the u ?

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Can we distinguish between the u ? Yes, with OMEGARETRIEVER

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KNAPSACKGEN (u, ω') will be close to KNAPSACKGEN (u, ω) . KNAPSACKGEN (u', ω'') will be not.

•
$$\mathbf{u} \stackrel{wPRNG}{\longrightarrow} u_1, \dots, u_m$$

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OmegaRetriever from FSE 2011 (part 2)

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Experimental results are close to the bound.









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- 1. $\mathbf{v} = U \times \boldsymbol{\omega} \mod 2^n$
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But ω' defined as $U \times \omega' \equiv \mathbf{v}' \mod 2^n$ is close to $\omega!$

Why does it work ?

- $\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}'$ is small and equal to $U imes (\boldsymbol{\omega} \boldsymbol{\omega}') mod 2^n$
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- $\boldsymbol{\omega} \boldsymbol{\omega}' = T \times (\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}') \mod 2^n$
- We can bound T and $(\mathbf{v}-\mathbf{v}')$
- BUT $\|\boldsymbol{\omega} \boldsymbol{\omega}'\| \ll \|T\| \times \|(\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}')\|$

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- 3 How do I know that $(\mathbf{v}-\mathbf{v}') \text{ is a red point } ?$

We denote A_K the set of red points

$$|A_K| = (2 \times \lfloor K/\|U\|\rfloor - 1)^n$$



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We denote B_K the set of points in the ball



How many point in B_K ?



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Gaussian Heuristic : $|B_K| \simeq Volume(Ball)/Volume(\Lambda)$

In the case where n = 32, m = 42 and $\ell \le 15$,

 $|A_K| \ge |B_K|$ with $K = 2^{\ell+1}$



Thus $\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}'$ is a red point and $\|\boldsymbol{\omega} - \boldsymbol{\omega}'\| < K/\|U\|$.

Experimental results

l	5		10		15		20		25	
m	34	40	34	40	34	40	35	40	39	40
√bits (over 32)	27	28	22	23	5	18	4	13	6	8

Figure: Quality of ω' for n = 32

l	5		10		15		20
m	34	40	35	40	36	40	41
√bits (over 32)	10	22	10	17	8	12	6

Figure: Quality of ω' for n=32 for FSE 2011 algorithm

Thank you for your attention,