### Security study of a MQ-Commitment

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# **Goal of our Work**

### **MQ** commitment

- Post-quantum commitment.
- possibility to produce zero knowledge proof on the message with MPC-in-the-head methods.
- Security relies on the problem of solving multivariate quadratic polynomials (MQ problem).
- $\Rightarrow$  Zero knowledge proof better than  $Commit(\mu, r) = SHA256(\mu \| r)$ .

### My work

- Cryptanalysis of this commitment.
- Study of specifics instances of the MQ problem.
- Finding optimal parameters.

### **MQ** Problem

▶ Let *F* a random quadratic map from  $\mathbb{F}_q^n$  to  $\mathbb{F}_q^m$ , i.e.  $F = f_1, \ldots, f_m$  in *n* variables  $\mathbf{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_n$  in  $\mathbb{F}_q^n$  with  $f_i$  quadratic polynomials.

• The quadratic polynomials are denoted by:

$$f_i(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x}^T A_i \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{b_i}^T \mathbf{x} + c_i$$

with  $A_i \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times n}$ ,  $\mathbf{b_i} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  and  $c_i \in \mathbb{F}_q$ .

• MQ problem: Find a  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  such that  $F(\mathbf{x}) = 0$ 

#### **Our Commitment**

Let  $\mathbb{F}_q$  be a finite field and k, n and m positive integers. The (q, k, n, m)-MQ commitment is defined as follows:

- ▶ Setup: Sample two random quadratic maps F (resp. G) from  $\mathbb{F}_q^n$  to  $\mathbb{F}_q^k$  (resp.  $\mathbb{F}_q^m$ ). Public parameters  $\rightarrow (q, k, n, m, F, G)$ .
- ▶ **Commit:** Given a message  $\mu \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ , the commit is  $c \to (\mu + F(\mathbf{r}), G(\mathbf{r}))$  with  $\mathbf{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_q^n$ .
- Verification: We recompute the commitment.

#### **Parameters examples**

$$q = 256, k = 246, n = 115, m = 32$$

# **MQ Commitment - Security Properties**

Commitment

 $Commit(\mu, \mathbf{r}) = (\mu + F(\mathbf{r}), G(\mathbf{r}))$ 

### **Properties of our Commitment Scheme**

- Hiding: Let μ and μ' two messages chosen by the adversary and c = (c<sub>1</sub>, c<sub>2</sub>) the commitment of one of these messages. The adversary needs to find if c is the commitment for μ or μ'.
- **Binding:** The adversary needs to find a commitment c and two messages  $\mu$  and  $\mu'$  such that c is a valid commitment for  $\mu$  and  $\mu'$ .

**Statistically binding:**  $\rightarrow$  Very low probability  $(2^{-\lambda})$  of the existence of a collision.

**Computationally binding:**  $\rightarrow$  Finding a collision is hard (2<sup> $\lambda$ </sup> operations) With  $\lambda$  the level of security

# **Computationally Hiding**

 $\mathit{c} = (\mathit{c}_1, \mathit{c}_2)$  commitment of  $\mu$  or  $\mu'$  ?

### Best known attack

We try to find r such that:

$$\mu + F(\mathbf{r}) - c_1 = 0$$
 and  $G(\mathbf{r}) - c_2 = 0$ 

If we find a solution,  $\mu$  is the message, else it is  $\mu'.$ 

- MQ problem with a random quadratic map from  $\mathbb{F}_q^n$  to  $\mathbb{F}_q^{k+m}$ .
- Well studied complexity.
- Formal proof with important security loss.
- Parameter with q = 256 for 128 bits of security:

Hiding	Pro	ovable	Heuristic			
	n	т	п	т		
	912	1872	115	278		

# **Breaking the Binding Property**

#### Finding a collision on the commitement

• If we have  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  and  $\Delta$  with  $\Delta \neq 0$  such that:

$$G(\mathbf{x}) = G(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) \tag{1}$$

▶ Let's be  $\mu \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$  and  $\mu' \leftarrow \mu + F(\mathbf{x}) - F(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{\Delta})$  and we have:

$$Commit(\mu', \mathbf{x} + \Delta) = (\mu' + F(\mathbf{x} + \Delta), G(\mathbf{x} + \Delta))$$
$$= (\mu + F(\mathbf{x}) - F(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) + F(\mathbf{x} + \Delta), G(\mathbf{x}))$$
$$= (\mu + F(\mathbf{r}), G(\mathbf{r}))$$
$$= Commit(\mu, \mathbf{x})$$

• Breaking the binding property is equivalent to finding a solution for (1)

# **Statistically Binding**

### Injective quadratic map

*G* quadratic map from  $\mathbb{F}_q^n$  to  $\mathbb{F}_q^m$ . If  $m \gg n$ , then we expect *G* to be **injective** with high probability; In this case  $G(x) = G(x + \Delta)$  implies that  $\Delta = 0$ .  $\rightarrow$  Statistically binding. **Example:** For  $\mathbb{K} = 257$  and a security level of 128 bits we need  $\rightarrow m > 2 * n + 16$ 

Case m > 2n:

- Statistically binding.
- If  $m \leq 2n$ , G is not injective.

 $\rightarrow$  Goal: obtaining smaller commitments with computational binding.

## **Computational Binding**

#### Finding a collision on G

- Studied cases :  $m \leq 2n$ .
- We have to solve **structured** polynomials.

#### First study of the structure of our system

We want **x** and  $\Delta$  such that  $\Delta \neq 0$  and for  $1 \leq i \leq m$ :

$$g_i(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) - g_i(\mathbf{x}) = 0$$

With  $g_i(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x}^T A_i \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{b_i}^T \mathbf{x} + c_i$ 

$$g_i(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) - g_i(\mathbf{x}) = (\mathbf{x} + \Delta)^T A_i(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) - \mathbf{x}^T A_i \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{b_i}^T \Delta$$
$$= \Delta^T A_i \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{x}^T A_i \Delta + \Delta^T A \Delta + \mathbf{b_i}^T \Delta$$

#### $\rightarrow$ Linear in x

# **Computationally Binding**

**Finding a collision on** *G***- Easy case:**  $m \le n$ 

- We choose random values for the entire  $\Delta$ .
- We have now a random **linear** system of m equations in n variables.
- If  $m \leq n$ , this linear system will have a solution with great probability.

### If $m \leq n$

- We just have a linear system to solve.
- $\rightarrow m^3$  operations.
- The problem is easy.
- Unusable parameters.

# **Computationally Binding - Naive Algorithm**

### **Studied case**

- $n \le m \le 2n$
- We want to solve  $G(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) = G(\mathbf{x})$  with  $\Delta \neq 0$ .

### Naive algorithm

- **(1)** We set the *n* variables of  $\Delta$  to random values.
- **2** We have m random linear equations in n variables.
  - ightarrow This system has a solution with probability  $q^{-(m-n)}$
- 3 We try to solve this system

We have to repeat this in average  $q^{(m-n)}$  to find a solution.  $\rightarrow q^{(m-n)}n^3$  operations in average.

# **Computationally Binding - Algebraic methods**

#### **Studied case**

- $n \le m \le 2n$
- We want to solve  $G(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) = G(\mathbf{x})$  with  $\Delta \neq 0$ .

### Reduction to a bilinear system

We want for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ :

$$g_i(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) - g_i(\mathbf{x}) = 0$$

And so:

$$g_i(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) - g_i(\mathbf{x}) = (\mathbf{x} + \Delta)^T A_i(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) - \mathbf{x}^T A_i \mathbf{x} + \Delta^T \mathbf{b}_i$$
$$= \Delta^T A_i \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{x}^T A_i \Delta + \Delta^T A_i \Delta + \Delta^T \mathbf{b}_i$$
$$= (\Delta + 2\mathbf{x})^T A_i \Delta + \Delta^T \mathbf{b}_i$$

Bilinear system !

Only if A is a symmetric matrix  $\rightarrow q \neq 2^k$ .

# **Reduction to Bilinear systems**

#### **Bilinear Systems**

*m* bilinear polynomials  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  in  $n_x + n_y$  variables  $\mathbf{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_{n_x}$  and  $\mathbf{y} = y_1, \ldots, y_{n_y}$ with  $f_i(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x}^T A_i \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{b}_i^T \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{c}_i^T \mathbf{y} + e_i$ 

### Reduction to a bilinear system

We have:

$$g_i(\mathbf{x}+\Delta)-g_i(\mathbf{x})=(\Delta+2\mathbf{x})^{ op}A\Delta+\Delta^{ op}\mathbf{b}_i$$

Let  $\mathbf{y} = 2\mathbf{x} + \Delta$  and  $\Delta_0 = 1$ :

$$g_i(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) - g_i(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}^T A_{i,\{1,n\}} \Delta_{1,n} + \mathbf{b}_{i,\{1,n\}} \Delta_{1,n}^T + A_{i,0} \mathbf{y}^T + b_{i,0}$$

# **Solving Bilinear Systems**

### **Bilinear Systems**

*m* bilinear polynomials  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  in  $n_x + n_y$  variables  $\mathbf{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_{n_x}$  and  $\mathbf{y} = y_1, \ldots, y_{n_y}$ with  $f_i(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x}^T A_i \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{b}_i^T \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{c}_i^T \mathbf{y} + e_i$ 

 $A_i$ , **b**<sub>i</sub>, **c**<sub>i</sub> and  $e_i$  are uniformly random on  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .

- $n_x + n_y = m$ : Known complexity [Faugère et al., 2011].
- *n<sub>x</sub>* + *n<sub>y</sub>* ≤ *m*: Open problem
  Intuition : We have a lower bound on the complexity with given *n<sub>x</sub>*, *n<sub>y</sub>* and *m*.

# New Algorithm for Finding a Collision

### **Studied case**

- ▶  $n \le m \le 2n$
- We want to solve  $G(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) = G(\mathbf{x})$  with  $\Delta \neq 0$ .

### Algebraic algorithm

- **1** We set the 2n m variables of  $\Delta$  to random values.
- **2** We have m random bilinear equations in m variables.
- **3** We try to solve this system with algebraic algorithm.
  - $\rightarrow$  This system has a solution with great probability.

Known complexity !

# Hybrid Method

Let F be a quadratic map from  $\mathbb{F}_q^m$  to  $\mathbb{F}_q^m$  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  in m variables.

#### Hybrid method [Bettale et al., 2012]

- **1** We set k variables to random values.
- **2** We have m quadratics equations in m k variables.
- **3** We try to solve this system with algebraic algorithm.
  - $\rightarrow$  This system has a solution with probability  $q^{-k}$ .

We have to repeat this operation  $q^k$  times in average.

# Hybrid method for our case

### Hybrid algorithm

- **(1)** We set the 2n m + k variables of  $\Delta$  to random values.
- **2** We have *m* random bilinear equations in m-k variables.
- **3** We try to solve this system with algebraic algorithm.
  - $\rightarrow$  This system has a solution with probability  $q^{-k}$ .

We have to repeat this operation  $q^k$  times in average.

Claim: Lower bound on the complexity.

### Macaulay matrix

$$f_0(\mathbf{x}) = x_0^2 + 100x_0x_1 - 11x_1^2 - 121x_0x_2 + 23x_1x_2 - 104x_2^2 + 101x_0 - 22x_1 + 101x_0 - 36x_1 + 101x_1 - 100x_1 + 100x_1 +$$

### Macaulay matrix d = 2

# Macaulay matrix

$$f_0(\mathbf{x}) = x_0^2 + 100x_0x_1 - 11x_1^2 - 121x_0x_2 + 23x_1x_2 - 104x_2^2 + 101x_0 - 22x_1 + 7x_2 - 36$$
  
$$f_1(\mathbf{x}) = x_0x_1 - 13x_1^2 - 38x_0x_2 - 19x_1x_2 + 19x_2^2 - 86x_0 + 33x_1 - 24x_2 - 45$$

### Macaulay matrix d = 3

	$x_{0}^{3}$	$x_0^2 x_1$		$x_{2}^{3}$	$x_{0}^{2}$	$x_0 x_1$	$x_{1}^{2}$	<i>x</i> <sub>0</sub> <i>x</i> <sub>2</sub>	$x_1 x_2$	$x_{2}^{2}$	<i>x</i> <sub>0</sub>	$x_1$	<i>x</i> <sub>2</sub>	1
$f_0$	( 0	0	• • •	0	1	100	-11	-121	23	-104	101	-22	7	-36
													-24	
-												0	0	0
$x_1 f_0$	0	1	• • •	0	0	101	33	0	7	0	0	-36	0	0
÷														
$x_2 f_1$		0		19	0	0	0	-86	33	-24	0	0	-45	0 /

# **XL** algorithm

### Requirement

System with one or zero solution.

 $\Rightarrow\,$  Square or overdetermined system.

### Algorithm

- () We compute the Macaulay matrix of degree i for  $i \in \mathbb{N}$
- 2 Until full rank (as many linearly independant rows as columns)
- 3 Search a solution to the linear system (Block-Wiedemann)

If quadratic system has:

- ▶ 1 solution: We found the only solution
- $\blacktriangleright$  0 solution: linear system  $\rightarrow$  no solution

Goal : Knowing the degree denote d for given parameters

 $\Rightarrow \ {\sf Known \ complexity}$ 

# **XL** algorithm

#### **Problem: Linear dependencies**

- $\blacktriangleright~\#$  lines of Macaulay matrix  $\rightarrow$  known
- **but** linear dependencies.

• Example 
$$f_0 = x_0^2 + x_2$$
 and  $f_1 = x_1x_2 + 1$ 

$$x_1 x_2 f_0 + f_0 - x_0^2 f_1 - x_2 f_1 = f_1 f_0 - f_0 f_1 = 0$$

 $\Rightarrow$  Linear dependence in the degree 4 Macaulay matrix.


#### **Random systems**

- ▶ F5 criterium.
- > We known exactly how many linearly interdependent rows we have at any degree.
- ▶ *d* smallest degree.
- Known complexity.

## Macaulay matrix on bilinear systems

$$f_0(\mathbf{x}) = x_0 x_1 - 121 x_0 y_0 + 23 x_1 y_0 + 101 x_0 - 22 x_1 + 7 y_0 - 36$$
  
$$f_1(\mathbf{x}) = x_0 y_0 - 19 x_1 y_0 - 86 x_0 + 33 x_1 - 24 y_0 - 45$$

#### Macaulay matrix d = 3



No  $x_i^d$  and  $y_i^d$  monomials.

# XL on bilinear systems

### Square bilinear systems

- > Less monomials and more linear dependencies than random systems.
- ▶ Specific criterium for square random bilinear systems [Faugère et al., 2011].
- ▶ known *d*.

### **Overdetemined bilinear systems**

- More linear dependencies than square systems.
- ▶ Criterium from [Faugère et al., 2011] don't get them all.
- ▶ Intuition: we have **less** linearly independent rows than expected.
- $\Rightarrow$  Expected *d* is smaller than real degree.
- $\Rightarrow$  Lower bound on the complexity.

# **Optimal parameters**

Goal : small *m* (optimal commitment size),  $q \sim 257$ 

**Studied case** 

- ▶  $n \le m \le 2n$
- We want to solve  $G(\mathbf{x} + \Delta) = G(\mathbf{x})$  with  $\Delta \neq 0$ .

Naive algorithm	XL algorithm	Hybrid XL algorithm
$q^{(m-n)}n^3$	$\binom{m+2}{2}\binom{2m-n}{m-n}^2$	$q^k {m-k+2 \choose 2} {m-k+d \choose d}^2$
Optimal in our case.	Optimal when exhaustive search on $\mathbb{F}_q$ is too costly.	<i>d</i> is a lower bound. We choose <i>k</i> to be optimal.

# Summary and Work in Progress

### Summary for binding security study

	$m \leq n$	$n \le m \le 2n$	$m \ge 2n$
Binding security	No	Computational	Statistical
Time complexity	<i>m</i> <sup>3</sup>	$q^{m-n}n^3$	

With  $2 \le \omega \le 3$ 

### Work in progress

- ▶ Proof for our assumption.
- ▶ Study the possible application of the Hybrid method on bilinear systems.

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# Thank you for your attention !